Hanson On The Terror Network
Over at National Review Online’s The Corner, Victor Davis Hanson touches on a point that I think is essential for understanding the modern Islamist terror network. Hanson writes:
At a meeting the other day with some political scientists, I was lectured by some that there was nothing such as jihadism in the comprehensive sense. That is, that Hamas, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc. simply have entirely separate agendas, understandable (i.e., Israel, "occupation" of Arab lands) and particularist grievances, etc. rather than a deeply shared anger at the West that originates from a common sense of lost pride and frustration, brought on by recognition of failure when zeal and religious purity do not restore honor or influence in the age of globalization.
The “political scientists” Hanson mentions are, not surprisingly, relaying the conventional wisdom on terrorism. That is, it is widely believed that all of the various terrorist entities in the Middle East can be carved up into neatly drawn ideological boxes. According to this line of thinking, ideological differences coupled with narrowly defined local agendas preclude any sustained cooperation between the various heads of the terrorist hydra.
For example, it is widely believed that the Iranian-controlled and Shiite Hezbollah could never sustain cooperation with the stateless and Sunni al Qaeda. Hezbollah and al Qaeda not only have competing religious sentiments, it is argued, but also widely disparate interests. Hezbollah is mainly focused on completing its takeover of Lebanon and defeating Israel, while al Qaeda’s main goal is (among other goals) to force the U.S. out of the Middle East altogether.
Hanson rightly concludes that this line of thinking is deficient. He offers a handful of historical examples, including the alliance between axis powers in World War II, to prove his point. Ideological or localized agendas have not precluded cooperation between our adversaries in the past.
But while historical analogies are certainly useful, the actual facts of the matter are conclusive. The prevailing paradigm simply does not reflect abundant evidence. Since I am writing a booklet that covers this very same subject, let me share just four brief examples that run counter to the conventional wisdom:
Example # 1: The Relationship between Sunni Sudan and Shiite Iran.
The Clinton administration added Sudan to the State Department’s state-sponsors of terrorism list in 1993. The primary concern at the time was the relationship between the relatively new Sunni Islamist government in Sudan and the Iranian regime. Clinton administration officials made countless references to their fear that Sudan and Iran were working together to export terrorism.
Sudan’s ideological leader, Hassan al-Turabi, a member of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, embraced Iran (as well as Saddam’s Iraq). Turabi’s vision was to bring together as many of the anti-Western, anti-Israel, and anti-American terrorist constituencies as he could. This is what led him, in part, to give bin Laden and his al Qaeda cohorts safehaven in Sudan from 1992 to 1996.
As a consequence of the first Gulf War, Turabi sought to unite terrorist interests, regardless of religious or ideological differences, together against their common enemy: the United States. Turabi calculated that if all these groups pooled their interests they could force America out of the region. The result was a terrorist melting pot in which Sudan became a breeding ground for terrorism with all of the terrorist groups listed by Hanson above and many more represented. Iraqi and Iranian intelligence were heavily represented as well.
It was in this context that al Qaeda’s international designs were forged. Numerous attacks organized on Sudanese soil against U.S. and Western interests followed.
(For more on Turabi’s role in bringing together the international terrorist network, go here and here. Turabi, by the way, is a free man.)
Example #2: Iran’s number one Hezbollah terrorist, Imad Mugniyah, trained al Qaeda’s operatives and has a long-standing relationship with Osama bin Laden.
According to Ali Mohamed, a top al Qaeda operative convicted for his involvement in the August 1998 embassy bombings, Osama bin Laden personally requested Imad Mugniyah’s help in organizing attacks against American interests. Mugniyah is the most ruthless terrorist in history, having run Hezbollah’s attacks against the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, as well as the kidnap and torture (to death) of the CIA’s top man in Lebanon in 1984. Those attacks drove the U.S. out of Lebanon and, according to Ali Mohamed, bin Laden wanted to model his terrorist organization after Hezbollah’s success.
Bin Laden’s wish was granted. Mughniyah’s Hezbollah trained al Qaeda operatives in how to build suicide truck bombs. Some of these same operatives then simultaneously destroyed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, just as Mugniyah’s henchmen destroyed the U.S. embassy in Lebanon in April 1983.
This was not the last time Mughniyah’s fingerprints were found on one of al Qaeda’s attacks. The 9-11 Commission found that a “senior Hezbollah” terrorist - that is, Mughniyah - had personally escorted some of the muscle hijackers.
(For a more complete write-up of example #2, go here.)
Example #3: The Clinton administration recognized the alliance between Hezbollah and al Qaeda in its first indictment of al Qaeda. In addition, Clinton administration officials have long recognized that Iran supported al Qaeda.
(For more on example #3, go here.)
Example #4: Iran helped the Taliban, which had previously been a sworn enemy, as well as al Qaeda escape approaching American-led forces in 2001.
(For more on this, go here.)
These are just a handful of examples, chosen from many, of why the conventional wisdom about terrorism is flat wrong. Hanson is right, for a lot of reasons.
At a meeting the other day with some political scientists, I was lectured by some that there was nothing such as jihadism in the comprehensive sense. That is, that Hamas, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc. simply have entirely separate agendas, understandable (i.e., Israel, "occupation" of Arab lands) and particularist grievances, etc. rather than a deeply shared anger at the West that originates from a common sense of lost pride and frustration, brought on by recognition of failure when zeal and religious purity do not restore honor or influence in the age of globalization.
The “political scientists” Hanson mentions are, not surprisingly, relaying the conventional wisdom on terrorism. That is, it is widely believed that all of the various terrorist entities in the Middle East can be carved up into neatly drawn ideological boxes. According to this line of thinking, ideological differences coupled with narrowly defined local agendas preclude any sustained cooperation between the various heads of the terrorist hydra.
For example, it is widely believed that the Iranian-controlled and Shiite Hezbollah could never sustain cooperation with the stateless and Sunni al Qaeda. Hezbollah and al Qaeda not only have competing religious sentiments, it is argued, but also widely disparate interests. Hezbollah is mainly focused on completing its takeover of Lebanon and defeating Israel, while al Qaeda’s main goal is (among other goals) to force the U.S. out of the Middle East altogether.
Hanson rightly concludes that this line of thinking is deficient. He offers a handful of historical examples, including the alliance between axis powers in World War II, to prove his point. Ideological or localized agendas have not precluded cooperation between our adversaries in the past.
But while historical analogies are certainly useful, the actual facts of the matter are conclusive. The prevailing paradigm simply does not reflect abundant evidence. Since I am writing a booklet that covers this very same subject, let me share just four brief examples that run counter to the conventional wisdom:
Example # 1: The Relationship between Sunni Sudan and Shiite Iran.
The Clinton administration added Sudan to the State Department’s state-sponsors of terrorism list in 1993. The primary concern at the time was the relationship between the relatively new Sunni Islamist government in Sudan and the Iranian regime. Clinton administration officials made countless references to their fear that Sudan and Iran were working together to export terrorism.
Sudan’s ideological leader, Hassan al-Turabi, a member of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, embraced Iran (as well as Saddam’s Iraq). Turabi’s vision was to bring together as many of the anti-Western, anti-Israel, and anti-American terrorist constituencies as he could. This is what led him, in part, to give bin Laden and his al Qaeda cohorts safehaven in Sudan from 1992 to 1996.
As a consequence of the first Gulf War, Turabi sought to unite terrorist interests, regardless of religious or ideological differences, together against their common enemy: the United States. Turabi calculated that if all these groups pooled their interests they could force America out of the region. The result was a terrorist melting pot in which Sudan became a breeding ground for terrorism with all of the terrorist groups listed by Hanson above and many more represented. Iraqi and Iranian intelligence were heavily represented as well.
It was in this context that al Qaeda’s international designs were forged. Numerous attacks organized on Sudanese soil against U.S. and Western interests followed.
(For more on Turabi’s role in bringing together the international terrorist network, go here and here. Turabi, by the way, is a free man.)
Example #2: Iran’s number one Hezbollah terrorist, Imad Mugniyah, trained al Qaeda’s operatives and has a long-standing relationship with Osama bin Laden.
According to Ali Mohamed, a top al Qaeda operative convicted for his involvement in the August 1998 embassy bombings, Osama bin Laden personally requested Imad Mugniyah’s help in organizing attacks against American interests. Mugniyah is the most ruthless terrorist in history, having run Hezbollah’s attacks against the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, as well as the kidnap and torture (to death) of the CIA’s top man in Lebanon in 1984. Those attacks drove the U.S. out of Lebanon and, according to Ali Mohamed, bin Laden wanted to model his terrorist organization after Hezbollah’s success.
Bin Laden’s wish was granted. Mughniyah’s Hezbollah trained al Qaeda operatives in how to build suicide truck bombs. Some of these same operatives then simultaneously destroyed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, just as Mugniyah’s henchmen destroyed the U.S. embassy in Lebanon in April 1983.
This was not the last time Mughniyah’s fingerprints were found on one of al Qaeda’s attacks. The 9-11 Commission found that a “senior Hezbollah” terrorist - that is, Mughniyah - had personally escorted some of the muscle hijackers.
(For a more complete write-up of example #2, go here.)
Example #3: The Clinton administration recognized the alliance between Hezbollah and al Qaeda in its first indictment of al Qaeda. In addition, Clinton administration officials have long recognized that Iran supported al Qaeda.
(For more on example #3, go here.)
Example #4: Iran helped the Taliban, which had previously been a sworn enemy, as well as al Qaeda escape approaching American-led forces in 2001.
(For more on this, go here.)
These are just a handful of examples, chosen from many, of why the conventional wisdom about terrorism is flat wrong. Hanson is right, for a lot of reasons.
posted by Thomas Joscelyn at 4:14 PM
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