Zarqawi and the Murder of Laurence Foley

Now that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is dead, there will be a lot of nonsense written about how his presence in Iraq really was not evidence of a link between Saddam's regime and al Qaeda, as the Bush administration claimed. There is a wealth of evidence that indicates otherwise, but consider one of the more intriguing pieces of evidence: the assassination of Laurence Foley.

The assassination is one of the more illuminating pieces of evidence concerning the CIA's less-than-rigorous analytical abilities and how obstinate some analysts had become in refusing to connect the dots. For example, the Senate Intelligence Report offers this interesting paragraph (p. 341):

"The CIA also looked into the possibility that the Iraqi regime was involved in the al-Zarqawi network murder of USAID official Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan in December 2002. [Redacted] two suspects in the Foley murder, indicated that Iraqi territory may have been used to facilitate travel and the supply of weapons to the al-Zarqawi group in Jordan. But, neither of the two suspects provided any information on links between al-Zarqawi and the Iraqi regime. [Redacted] one of the two suspects in the Foley murder stated that al-Zarqawi directed and financed the operations before, during and after his stint in Baghdad between May and July 2002. The other suspect mentioned that weapons for their operations in Jordan had come from an unspecified place in Iraq. [Redacted] an associate of Foley's killer left Jordan to join al-Zarqawi in Iraq after the murder to obtain weapons and explosives for future operations. Both of the suspects [redacted] mentioned that one member of the al-Zarqawi network traveled repeatedly between regime-controlled Iraq and Syria after March 2002."

Now, stop and think about the contents of that paragraph. We know that the planning for the murder took place, in part, during Zarqawi's time in Baghdad. That he and his co-conspirators were moving around regime-controlled Iraq (not just Kurdistan!) with ease. That weapons came from an unspecified location in Iraq. And that one member of Zarqawi's network traveled "repeatedly between regime-controlled Iraq and Syria after March 2002."

All of this and the CIA told the Senate Intelligence Committee's staffers that neither of the suspects discussed Zarqawi's ties to the Iraqi regime, nor was there any evidence of Saddam's complicity. Right. Zarqawi was in Baghdad. Baghdad. You know, Saddam's neo-Stalinist capital where any suspicious activity was ruthlessly monitored and suppressed. And yet, Zarqawi wasn't dissuaded from staying for several months. Nor was he dissuaded from planning Foley's assassination while in Baghdad.

Is all of the above evidence of Saddam's complicity in the attack? It sure is. But this didn't stop the CIA from refraining from making such a conclusion in its January 2003 edition of Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was supplied to policymakers. The very next paragraph in the Senate Intelligence Report reads:

The intelligence reporting on the Foley assassination available at the time of the January 2003 publication of Iraqi Support for Terrorism does not indicate Iraqi government complicity in this attack. A later intelligence report received on February 11, 2003, from a [redacted] The CIA has not provided the Committee with any further information was directly involved in this assassination.

Every time a former CIA official laments the fact that the Bush administration did not listen to his or her judgments on the issue of Iraq-al Qaeda (e.g. Paul Pillar), think of the Foley assassination. It is a good example of how evidence was and is systematically downplayed or ignored by some key players in the U.S. Intelligence Community.