More Troops, Please
From Max Boot in the LA Times:
I HAVE NEVER been a dogmatist on the issue of troop levels. I was not one of those who criticized the original invasion force in 2003 for being too small. There were enough troops to take Baghdad, and there were legitimate reasons to fear that sending too many Americans would cause a backlash. Better to have focused on supporting Iraqi security forces — except there were none to support. The Iraqi army was dissolved by the U.S., and no serious effort was made for a whole year to field a replacement force, creating a security vacuum that has never been filled.
By now it should be obvious that the "light footprint" approach has not worked. It has increased, not decreased, resentment of the United States because Iraqis are aggrieved by the breakdown of law and order. Yet there appears to be no serious rethinking of this flawed strategy at either the Pentagon or the White House.
The administration may think it doesn't have any more troops to send. It's true that the armed forces are overstretched and need to be enlarged, but there are still just 150,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq out of 2.6 million in the active-duty ranks, reserves and National Guard. More soldiers could be found to police Baghdad if this were deemed a top priority.
Some in the administration may think that increasing troop numbers, which may bring more casualties, would be political poison. But what's really hurting Republicans politically is not the number of troops in Iraq, or even the continuing casualties. It's the perception that we're not winning. If a heightened troop presence could establish security in Baghdad, the president and his party would reap a reward at the polls.
The fact that the administration continues to "stay the course" with a losing strategy suggests the need for a change of strategists. The president needs a new secretary of Defense — and possibly new generals — who would be more focused on finding a way to win rather than to withdraw.
I'll add one quick note. There are multiple reasons the "light footprint" strategy was doomed to failure. In particular, our analysts had misjudged just how much of a terrorist state Saddam's Iraq had become. The conventional forces our military planned to face had been superseded by irregular paramilitary forces by the mid-1990s.
I HAVE NEVER been a dogmatist on the issue of troop levels. I was not one of those who criticized the original invasion force in 2003 for being too small. There were enough troops to take Baghdad, and there were legitimate reasons to fear that sending too many Americans would cause a backlash. Better to have focused on supporting Iraqi security forces — except there were none to support. The Iraqi army was dissolved by the U.S., and no serious effort was made for a whole year to field a replacement force, creating a security vacuum that has never been filled.
By now it should be obvious that the "light footprint" approach has not worked. It has increased, not decreased, resentment of the United States because Iraqis are aggrieved by the breakdown of law and order. Yet there appears to be no serious rethinking of this flawed strategy at either the Pentagon or the White House.
The administration may think it doesn't have any more troops to send. It's true that the armed forces are overstretched and need to be enlarged, but there are still just 150,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq out of 2.6 million in the active-duty ranks, reserves and National Guard. More soldiers could be found to police Baghdad if this were deemed a top priority.
Some in the administration may think that increasing troop numbers, which may bring more casualties, would be political poison. But what's really hurting Republicans politically is not the number of troops in Iraq, or even the continuing casualties. It's the perception that we're not winning. If a heightened troop presence could establish security in Baghdad, the president and his party would reap a reward at the polls.
The fact that the administration continues to "stay the course" with a losing strategy suggests the need for a change of strategists. The president needs a new secretary of Defense — and possibly new generals — who would be more focused on finding a way to win rather than to withdraw.
I'll add one quick note. There are multiple reasons the "light footprint" strategy was doomed to failure. In particular, our analysts had misjudged just how much of a terrorist state Saddam's Iraq had become. The conventional forces our military planned to face had been superseded by irregular paramilitary forces by the mid-1990s.
posted by Thomas Joscelyn at 12:21 PM
<< Home