Hoekstra on Hayden
Representative Peter Hoekstra (Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee) on Porter Goss's replacement as CIA chief, Gen. Michael Hayden:
"wrong person, wrong place, wrong time"
Why is Hoekstra down on Hayden?
Hoekstra said on "Fox News Sunday" that he had "respect" for Hayden, the former head of the super-secret National Security Agency, but said it would send the "wrong signal" to have a general run an agency traditionally headed by a civilian.
I have mixed thoughts on the Hayden nomination. On the one hand, I think Hayden is uniquely qualified and one of the few that really gets the intelligence game. Hoekstra himself has said this. On the other hand, we need more competition within the intelligence community when it comes to analyzing intelligence, not less. If Hayden is going to tow the Pentagon's line and not push for more analytical diversity, then Hoekstra's fears are well-placed.
Part of the problem with the U.S. intelligence community has been what the 9/11 Commission accurately described as the prevalence of "group think." Too frequently the herd mentality overwhelmed real analysis and conclusions that should have been tentative, at best, became dogmatic, unassailable "truths."
To a large degree, this is what happened on the issue of Iraq's ties to al Qaeda. The simple reality of the situation is that the U.S. intelligence community did not have good firsthand intelligence inside either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda. Yet, many of our analysts felt comfortable and still feel comfortable making declarative statements about both. The "group think" on Iraq-al Qaeda spread quickly: ideology precluded cooperation. So, when evidence came from open sources, foreign governments, or on the rare occasion when the U.S. intelligence community did have a window into their activities that indicated otherwise, our analysts simply dismissed it.
After all, it wasn't consistent with the "group think."
This type of "thinking" wasn't and isn't universal within the intelligence community. But, it is all too common. We need more creative, alternative analyses to challenge the conventional wisdom. If Hayden's nomination means less analytical diversity and more conformity to the Pentagon's way of thinking, then I agree with Hoekstra's assessment. I am not convinced that Hayden's nomination means that, but that is what Hoekstra is arguing.
Senator John McCain on Hayden:
“In all due respect to my colleagues — and I obviously respect their views — General Hayden is really more of an intelligence person than he is an Air Force officer,” McCain said on “Face the Nation” on CBS. “I think that we should also remember that there had been other former military people who have been directors of the CIA.”
"wrong person, wrong place, wrong time"
Why is Hoekstra down on Hayden?
Hoekstra said on "Fox News Sunday" that he had "respect" for Hayden, the former head of the super-secret National Security Agency, but said it would send the "wrong signal" to have a general run an agency traditionally headed by a civilian.
I have mixed thoughts on the Hayden nomination. On the one hand, I think Hayden is uniquely qualified and one of the few that really gets the intelligence game. Hoekstra himself has said this. On the other hand, we need more competition within the intelligence community when it comes to analyzing intelligence, not less. If Hayden is going to tow the Pentagon's line and not push for more analytical diversity, then Hoekstra's fears are well-placed.
Part of the problem with the U.S. intelligence community has been what the 9/11 Commission accurately described as the prevalence of "group think." Too frequently the herd mentality overwhelmed real analysis and conclusions that should have been tentative, at best, became dogmatic, unassailable "truths."
To a large degree, this is what happened on the issue of Iraq's ties to al Qaeda. The simple reality of the situation is that the U.S. intelligence community did not have good firsthand intelligence inside either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda. Yet, many of our analysts felt comfortable and still feel comfortable making declarative statements about both. The "group think" on Iraq-al Qaeda spread quickly: ideology precluded cooperation. So, when evidence came from open sources, foreign governments, or on the rare occasion when the U.S. intelligence community did have a window into their activities that indicated otherwise, our analysts simply dismissed it.
After all, it wasn't consistent with the "group think."
This type of "thinking" wasn't and isn't universal within the intelligence community. But, it is all too common. We need more creative, alternative analyses to challenge the conventional wisdom. If Hayden's nomination means less analytical diversity and more conformity to the Pentagon's way of thinking, then I agree with Hoekstra's assessment. I am not convinced that Hayden's nomination means that, but that is what Hoekstra is arguing.
Senator John McCain on Hayden:
“In all due respect to my colleagues — and I obviously respect their views — General Hayden is really more of an intelligence person than he is an Air Force officer,” McCain said on “Face the Nation” on CBS. “I think that we should also remember that there had been other former military people who have been directors of the CIA.”

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