The Iraqi Intelligence Services' Labs
One of the documents recently released by the government is a copy of the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) description of the Iraqi intelligence services (IIS) and its activities. The document also includes handwritten comments by a member of the IIS concerning the accuracy of the FAS description. ThreatsWatch.org has published translations of these handwritten notes and, as John Hinderaker at Power Line points out, one of these notes says that the FAS description “contains some important and accurate details.” Hinderaker also points out that the IIS’s notes don’t dispute any portion of the FAS description, nor do they confirm every individual detail either.
Therefore, we are left to ask: How accurate was the FAS description of the IIS in the first place? Did it accurately describe the IIS’s activities prior to the war?
Yes, it did. In several important ways the FAS description accurately described the IIS’s activities, including those focused on producing “weapons, poisons, and explosives,” “operations of sabotage and assassination,” as well as training in terrorist tactics. These activities have been confirmed by the Iraqi Survey Group’s investigation into Iraq’s WMD’s, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation into the accuracy of prewar intelligence, other Iraqi Intelligence documents as well as additional pieces of evidence.
Consider the supporting evidence for just one of the key parts of the FAS description.
The FAS description reads: “Directorate 8. Technical Affairs. Located in the headquarters complex of the Mukhabarat, the Eight Directorate is responsible for development of materials needed for covert offensive operations. It contains advanced laboratories for testing and production of weapons, poisons, and explosives, as well as facilities for finger printing all Mukhabarat members.” [Emphasis Added.]
This turned out to be true. Although it is not clear if these operations were being housed under Directorate 8, the Iraqi Survey Group found:
“…information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. (See Annex A.)
• ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
• Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.
• The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
• The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.” [Emphasis in the original]
The Iraqi Survey Group also found:
“The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW agent.
…Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons, including ricin and aflatoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW agents for military use.”
While much has been made of the ISG’s findings concerning Iraq’s weapons-grade WMD arsenal (or lack thereof), the passages cited above had received little attention. Much of the ISG’s focus was on whether or not the IIS’s laboratories could be used to reconstitute large-scale chemical and biological weaponry. But, as recognized by the ISG, the labs could have served any number of purposes.
So, what was the IIS planning on doing with this capability? We don’t know. But, it is worth remembering that Abu Musab Zarqawi and his cohorts in Ansar al Islam were experimenting with various chemical and biological weapons, such as Ricin, in northern Iraq prior to the war. In fact, Ansar al Islam has been connected to multiple terrorist plots involving the use of Ricin in Europe (in Paris and England, for example). Al Qaeda was also apparently experimenting with Ricin in Afghanistan as well.
It is true that recipes for Ricin can be found via a number of open sources. But, isn’t it interesting that terrorists with known ties to the Iraqi regime also just happened to be experimenting with chemical and biological weapons the IIS found useful? Did al Qaeda and the IIS cooperate in these endeavors? We don’t know. But it certainly warrants further investigation.
Therefore, we are left to ask: How accurate was the FAS description of the IIS in the first place? Did it accurately describe the IIS’s activities prior to the war?
Yes, it did. In several important ways the FAS description accurately described the IIS’s activities, including those focused on producing “weapons, poisons, and explosives,” “operations of sabotage and assassination,” as well as training in terrorist tactics. These activities have been confirmed by the Iraqi Survey Group’s investigation into Iraq’s WMD’s, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation into the accuracy of prewar intelligence, other Iraqi Intelligence documents as well as additional pieces of evidence.
Consider the supporting evidence for just one of the key parts of the FAS description.
The FAS description reads: “Directorate 8. Technical Affairs. Located in the headquarters complex of the Mukhabarat, the Eight Directorate is responsible for development of materials needed for covert offensive operations. It contains advanced laboratories for testing and production of weapons, poisons, and explosives, as well as facilities for finger printing all Mukhabarat members.” [Emphasis Added.]
This turned out to be true. Although it is not clear if these operations were being housed under Directorate 8, the Iraqi Survey Group found:
“…information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. (See Annex A.)
• ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
• Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.
• The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
• The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.” [Emphasis in the original]
The Iraqi Survey Group also found:
“The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW agent.
…Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons, including ricin and aflatoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW agents for military use.”
While much has been made of the ISG’s findings concerning Iraq’s weapons-grade WMD arsenal (or lack thereof), the passages cited above had received little attention. Much of the ISG’s focus was on whether or not the IIS’s laboratories could be used to reconstitute large-scale chemical and biological weaponry. But, as recognized by the ISG, the labs could have served any number of purposes.
So, what was the IIS planning on doing with this capability? We don’t know. But, it is worth remembering that Abu Musab Zarqawi and his cohorts in Ansar al Islam were experimenting with various chemical and biological weapons, such as Ricin, in northern Iraq prior to the war. In fact, Ansar al Islam has been connected to multiple terrorist plots involving the use of Ricin in Europe (in Paris and England, for example). Al Qaeda was also apparently experimenting with Ricin in Afghanistan as well.
It is true that recipes for Ricin can be found via a number of open sources. But, isn’t it interesting that terrorists with known ties to the Iraqi regime also just happened to be experimenting with chemical and biological weapons the IIS found useful? Did al Qaeda and the IIS cooperate in these endeavors? We don’t know. But it certainly warrants further investigation.
posted by Thomas Joscelyn at 1:23 PM
<< Home